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extension, what we want to say, for the interlocutor is supposed to be our proxy about how of the normativity of meaning has been the central focus of the post-Kripkean (1982) literature on PI § §138-242 (for early touchstones, see Wright, 1984; McDowell, 1984; Boghossian, 1989) .
Work in this vein has been highly visible, and has spawned an interest in the normativity of meaning as such, quite apart from the question of the interpretation of Wittgenstein. The normativity of meaning now labels a subfield in the philosophy of language, whose mandate is to explore the nature and structure of the normative role of meaning in the context of contemporary thinking about semantics and pragmatics. (See Wikforss, 2001 , for an influential early treatment; Hattiangadi, 2007 , for a book-length discussion; and Ginsborg, 2011 , for an incisive review of Hattiangadi.)
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I said that the scene from PI §185 illustrates work done not just by meaning but by understanding. Indeed, Wittgenstein discusses understanding in PI § §138-242 at least as much as he discusses meaning. What issues are at stake in his treatment of understanding? One plausible candidate is, again, normativity. Just as we may speak of the student's response as being in accord (or conflict) with t may speak of that response as being in might look tempting to organize our reading of Wittgenstein's treatment of understanding around the issue of normativity (see, e.g., McDowell, 1998a) . But while Wittgenstein is certainly concerned with difficulties in our achieving a satisfactory view of how understanding can bear normatively on use, it would be a serious mistake to suppose that this is the only relationship between understanding and use our grasp of which is under scrutiny in this region of the
Investigations.
Consider the following remark:
Perhaps you will say here: to have got the system (or, again, to understand it) can't consist in continuing the series up to this or that number: that is only applying one's understanding. The understanding itself is a state which is the source of the correct use.
(PI §146)
It is not, or not simply, a thought about normativity that is the focus here. The interlocutor objects to the proposition that understanding the series of natural numbers consists in continuing the series up to some point or other, on the ground that this overlooks the distinction between understanding and . And the idea that understanding is something we might apply cannot be analyzed simply in terms of the idea that understanding bears normati Bridges 4
between following a rule and merely acting in accordance with a rule (cf. PG p.101, BB p.13).
Following the rule for the Fibonacci series, I write down, 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13 . What I have written is in accord with any number of rules for arithmetical series. But I am following only one: the rule for the Fibonacci series 2, 4, 6, 8 in meaning. But the student is not thereby applying all of these different understandings. The suggestion, brought to bear on this case, is that the student is applying one particular understanding, namely, the understanding of the order she in fact has at the time she
gives her response.
accords with a certain understanding of an order that she is applying that understanding of the order? Whatever else we might want to say about it, it is clear that the additional ingredient has an explanatory aspect. To say that the student is applying a certain understanding of the order in responding to it is to offer an explanation of her response; it is to say that she responds to the order as she does because she understands the order in that particular way. It is this explanatory role that the interlocutor endeavors to capture in speaking of understanding as the source of use.
Perhaps owing to its preoccupation with normativity, the secondary literature on PI § §138-242 and related regions of the later work has generally failed to recognize that
Wittgenstein is as concerned with the explanatory role of understanding as he is with the normative role of meaning and understanding (though see Haase, 2009 , for a noteworthy exception). To correct for this imbalance, I will in this chapter press on the scales the other way.
I will sketch out a dialectic between Wittgenstein and his interlocutor centered on the Bridges 5 explanatory role of understanding. We will see that various elements in the text become clearer when viewed in this light.
As I impl normativity is Kripke (1982) . But that the book has had this influence shows that it itself has been subject to an unduly narrow reading.
Wittgensteinian material that is its inspiration, is as much concerned with the explanatory role of understanding as it is with the normativity of meaning. A further goal of this chapter is to nal text.
T he guidance conception of understanding
What is it to apply your understanding of the meaning of an expression or utterance when you use or respond to it? The interlocutor has a single underlying idea about how to answer this question, which he offers in a variety of guises throughout PI § §138-242. His master thought is you can consult when you need to use or respond to the expression or utterance, and that will then show you how to proceed. Let us call this idea the guidance conception of understanding (cf. Stroud, 1996) .
Consider the proposal that what really comes before our mind when we understand a word is a picture (PI §139). For example, when you hear the word cube , a drawing of a cube comes before your mind (PI §139). Let us say you are participating in an objectidentification task: various things are placed before you in succession, and you are told to point at something if and only if it is a cube . An object is presented that is not a cube say, a idea of following a rule, has an explanatory aspect. There is at least this to be said for the guidance conception: the form of explanation to which it connects the application of understanding is one that is familiar and unmysterious. We do often, in everyday life, explain with guides, with items that show or tell them what to do. In PI §1, for example, the shopkeeper chooses the right color of apple because he consults a chart of color samples. It is true that the consultation the interlocutor envisions is not with a physical object but with an item before the mind . But we can consult and be guided by such items. If I am asked to determine whether it is appropriate to apply to a given object a word for a shade like or teal , it can certainly help me to bring to mind images of objects that have been previously presented to me as representatives of the meanings of these words say, an image of a certain sweater.
cube , the mental item that one is said to consult is an image of the object or kind of object for which the word stands. The example just mentioned suggests a closely related proposal for color-words: that these words call to mind images of objects that are samples of the appropriate shades and colors (see PI §239). But there are less pictorial ways to develop the idea of inner guidance interlocutor suggests that the student has an image, not of the sequence of numbers she is Faced with this difficulty, there is a temptation to suppose that mental items are different from their external counterparts in just the way needed to prevent a regress. The temptation, in other words, is to think that we can posit mental guides without being saddled by questions about second-order understandings. Mental guides are special. Perhaps we seek to capture their specialness by holding that they are self-interpreting (Fogelin, 2009, p.19 ). Or we say, as does
Wittgenstein when confronted with the observation that the same mental picture might be taken
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to speak either for or against applying cube to a triangular prism, I should have thought that the picture forced a particular use on me, with the elaboration that he had thought the forcing or compulsion at stake here to be not psychological but logical (PI §140). Talk of logical compulsion or self interpretation attempts to express the idea that a mental guide provides for its own understanding, thereby relieving the subject of the burden of doing the understanding herself.
As Wittgenstein realizes, the thought that tempts him is not even false: there is no genuine idea here but only the illusion of one. (PI §140 goes on: How could I think that? What did I think? , and finds no satisfactory answer to the second of these questions.) If an item is to cube by showing her how to apply it, then she must grasp what she is being shown. There is no getting around the fact that her understanding the item in this way will be a state of her. And so there is no getting around the fact that when we conceive the relationship between the mental committed to the presence of a second-order state of understanding on the part of the subject. To insist that the mental item interprets itself, or provides for its own understanding, is in effect an attempt to sidestep this simple point of logic. It is to claim that the subject both understands the ite work of understanding itself). However special the mind may be, it cannot be as special as to serve as a locus of logically-contradictory states of affairs.
M ind as mechanism
Why does Wittgenstein spend so much time on the guidance conception?
seemingly inexhaustible penchant for promoting that it belongs to the concept of an apparatus or mechanism that it is possible to characterize a component of an apparatus in two ways, either in relation to what the apparatus does or in relation to the way in which the apparatus is constructed. To take a familiar example, we might characterize a carburetor in terms of its contribution to produce motion (namely, its mixing fuel and air and sending it on to the combustion chamber) or in terms of its physical characteristics (e.g., its shape, the alloys of which it is composed.). Let us call the distinction here exemplified as that between characterizations at the level of activity and characterizations at the level of construction on our vision of the understanding as a state of a mechanism, we must find both constructionlevel and activity-level characterizations of that state.
The parenthetical bit in the above quotation a state of a mental apparatus (perhaps of the brain) might seem to indicate that the interlocutor is open to viewing the mind as a physical mechanism, with construction-level characterizations of its states to be couched in physical (e.g., (cf. Goldfarb, 1992 ). On the contrary, when he is struck by the curious effects that the mechanism of the mind seems capable of producing, he is inclined rather to suppose no physical mechanism
Bridges 12 could behave in this way (BB p.5). He thus seeks to understand the processes of the mind as exercises of a purely psychical mechanism (BB p.12). Now, the idea of a non-physical mechanism might seem a complete non-starter, suggesting configurations in some wispy spiritual material. And sometimes Wittgenstein does ascribe such a vision to his interlocutor: If one says that thought is a mental activity, or an activity of the mind, one thinks of the mind as a cloudy gaseous medium in which many things can happen which cannot occur in a different sphere, and from which many things can be expected that are otherwise not possible (PG p.100). But if we interpret the idea of mechanism at a certain degree of abstraction, we can make better sense of what it could be to understand the mind as a non-physical mechanism, and we can see in particular why Wittgenstein regards the guidance conception as an attempt to understand the mind in this way. The crucial point is that
we should hear the requirement of knowledge of the construction of the apparatus (PI §149) as at a bottom a demand for context-independent characterizations of the processes.
To elaborate: when we give activity-level characterizations of the states and processes of an object whose activity interests us, our characterizations will often relate the object to the environment in which it is situated. This will be so, for example, if our characterizations refer to interactions between the object and other particulars; it will also be so if the characterizations place what the object does in the context of larger systems or patterns of activity, involving other goings on in the world around it. In such cases, the concepts we bring to bear in specifying the will involve recognizing the object to stand in certain relationships to elements in its surroundings. The call for a construction -level characterization of a mechanism should be Bridges 13
processes, concepts whose suitability for such application we can recognize without our needing to bring into view the way in which the object is related to its surroundings. The aim, in other words, is to find characterizations of these states and processes such that we can abstract from the context in which the object is embedded such that we can, as it were, blot out the world around the object and still be in a position to make sense of, and see the applicability of, these characterizations.
To construe the mind as a mechanism is thus, as the passage just quoted from PG says, to think of it as a sphere , as a self-standing realm. But the form of self-standing-ness that is at stake is not fundamentally spatial or material (or pseudo-spatial and pseudo-material, as in talk of a gaseous medium): it is conceptual. What is self-standing, in the first instance, is our understanding of the states and processes of the object when we are conceptualizing them at the level of construction . When we describe the student as responding to the writing out the correct series, we obviously do not satisfy the context-independence requirement.
For we locate her activity in a complex context, involving both social interaction with a particular other person and participation in ongoing linguistic practices. A mechanistic account of understanding into view for us in a way that does not depend upon our grasp of these larger circumstance characterizations, to gain a distinctive kind of insight into the mental processes that provide for ion with the teacher. The aim of interpreting complex nexuses of activity through analysis into independently explicable mechanisms is a regulative ideal in many of our most fruitful ways of explaining what goes on in
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the world; it can be very tempting to suppose that we should seek such illumination into the activity of the mind as well.
Framing the idea of mechanism in terms of this abstract explanatory ideal, we can grasp why Wittgenstein regards the guidance conception as an attempt to treat the mind as a mechanism. The conception holds that a state of understanding is constituted by an item in the mind capable of guiding your performance. When you act upon your understanding, you consult the relevant item, and it shows you what to do. Now, on every variant of the conception the interlocutor proposes, the posited guiding item is what people tend to call a mental image a presence in the sensory or perceptual imagination. This is not a coincidence; it is internal to the conception. We cannot make sense of the idea of a consultation with an inner guide without having recourse to the quasi-perceptual relationship in which a subject stands to her mental images. The conception requires us to find inner items that can be intelligibly understood as showing or telling us things, and the quasi-perceptual presentness of a mental image the mode of presentness that can make it seem appealing to say of an image that it comes before the (PI §56) fits it uniquely for that role.
At the same time, it is the imagistic character of the hypothesized understandingconstituting items that can make the guidance conception seem like an attractive candidate for a mechanistic treatment of the states and processes of the mind that involve understanding. If we think of image say, of the formula x+2 we have access to a way of thinking about that state that nteraction.
Moreover, there is a tempting picture of mental imagery according to which we need essentially no context in view in order to make sense of a person as having a certain image. On this picture, respect to sensation and then with respect to images. 2 But we do not in fact need to appreciate the untenability of that picture to see that the guidance conception fails in its aim at providing a mechanistic treatment of the application of understanding. For even if we were to grant that the guidance conception satisfies the context-independence requirement in its characterizations of states of understanding, the question would remain how we are to understand its treatment of the explanatory relationship between such states and the subject . And as we have already seen, this treatment is subject to a regress; it presupposes the very nexus for which it is supposed to account.
1 At the limit, the thought that we need no conceptual background for making sense of applications of a given concept shades into the thought that our confrontation with the relevant phenomenon involves no conceptualization at all. Here we are in the territory targeting a Mythical conception of sensation, see McDowell (1998b) .
2 For the case of images, see the sections beginning around PI §361. The idea that we can straightaway make sense of supposing that a chair speaks to itself (PI §361) is a natural outgrowth of the thought that we know what it is to have images from avoiding such confusions One ought to ask, not what images are or what happens when one imagines anything, but how the word imagination is used (PI §370) applies to imagery an analogue to his point, discussed below, about the importance of keeping in view the in which we say a person understands.
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The guidance conception is just one stab at a mechanistic treatment of the mind. We might take the lesson of its failure to be that we should seek a different such treatment. But that is not the moral Wittgenstein wants us to draw: he wants us to give up the search for mental mechanisms entirely. Consider the following passage from Philosophical Grammar:
The problem that concerns us could be summed To search for such a process, then, must be to seek a way of conceptualizing understanding that does not depend upon our grasp of the role of the background; it must be to seek concepts capable of providing context-independent characterizations of states and processes of understanding. To give up the search for the characteristic process is just to give up the attempt to arrive at a mechanistic account of the operations of understanding.
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The same dialectic is traced, if a bit less explicitly, in the more well-known remark PI 154. There Wittgenstein cautions against construing your coming to understand the principle of to you. To construe understanding in this way would be to miss that it is a complex context of the formula occurs to you. Here again, what is at stake in the rhetoric to which the interlocutor is drawn but which Wittgenstein wishes to resist in this case, talk of a mental process that occurs behind or side by side imaginative presences is the impulse to seek a context-independent, mechanistic account of understanding.
Rationality and guidance
The move that I credited to Wittgenstein at the end of the previous section might strike a contemporary philosopher as unconvincing. Why should the moral of the defeat of the guidance conception be that we should abandon the search for mechanistic accounts of the mind entirely?
This can look like prospect of treating the mind as a physical mechanism might, with the benefit of hindsight, seem a serious lacuna. Contemporary mainstream philosophy of mind conceives itself as a part of cognitive science, with the project of cognitive science being to explain mental phenomena in terms of computational processes whose implementation in neural activity is in principle possible
(if empirically very difficult) to describe. The development of cognitive science is one of the great intellectual achievements of recent decades. In light of this, the idea that the mere untenability of the guidance conception should force us to give up the search for the characteristic process of understanding might seem to epitomize the scientific no-nothingism The explanatory nexus into which the interlocutor wishes to achieve insight is one in which the subject does what she does because of her recognition of a justification she has for doing that. The interlocutor wants to find a context-independent way of identifying the states and processes involved in this nexus, but he does not want to thereby lose sight of the elements of self-consciousness and justification. Precisely not: his aim is to capture these elements in the workings of a mechanism.
It is in virtue of this aim that the guidance conception can seem uniquely attractive. First, as we have already noted, concepts of mental imagery can appear to possess a highly atomic character, and hence to enable the framing of context-independent specifications of mental states.
But second, the concept of possession of a mental image incorporates the idea of self-knowledge:
it is part of the idea of having, e.g., a certain visual image that I know myself to be having it.
And third, the concept of guidance, of being shown or told how to do something, introduces an element of justification: when one is shown or told how to do something, one is thereby given a reason for proceeding in a particular way. Of course, our appreciation of this reason depends upon our understanding of what we are being shown or told to do, and it is just this point that ensnares the guidance conception in a regress. But if we have not yet thought through the
Bridges 20
conception with enough clarity to see the inevitability of regress, then in light of the three points just listed, the conception can seem to provide a satisfying mechanistic analysis of just the explanatory nexus we are trying to understand. It is much less obvious how, starting with naturalistic characterizations of states of the brain, we could work our way up to capturing the elements of self-consciousness and rationality that are definitive of this nexus.
If the appeal of the guidance conception, as an account of acting on an understanding of meaning, lies in its apparent potential to show how self-consciousness and rationality can be incorporated into the workings of a mental mechanism, then we should expect the interlocutor to find it tempting in a wider range of cases indeed, perhaps, in the case of any exercise of selfconscious rationality. It is in this light that we should view the lengthy set of remarks on reading glossed as the activity of rendering out loud what is written or printed that Wittgenstei order. Since Wittgenstein is explicit that understanding the meaning of what one is reading is not essential to reading as he wants to conceive it, the placement of these remarks can seem puzzling, and it is perhaps for that reason that they have received comparatively little attention in the secondary literature. A brief examination of their purport will help to reinforce the interpretation I have offered here of Wittgenstei PI § §138-242.
The discussion of reading is largely given over to querying what role the idea of a felt experience of influence or guidance should play in our reflections on the nature of the activity of reading aloud. The first point to note for our purposes is that Wittgenstein is explicitly concerned with the question of whether such an experience might be connected to the selfconscious rationality of the activity of reading aloud:
Bridges 21 One might say, I feel that the letters are the reason why I read such-and-such. Wittgenstein does not reject the first of these thoughts. To the contrary: he allows that we do say and think that we acted for a reason provided by the letters, and there is no indication that he regards us as mistaken for saying or thinking this. It is rather the second thought that is his target:
[The thought] that we felt the influence of the letters on us when readin appeals to us especially when we make a point of reading slowly perhaps in order to see what does happen when we read. When we, so to speak, quite intentionally let ourselves be guided carefully at the letters and perhaps excluding certain other thoughts. (PI §170)
The feeling of being guided or influenced by the letters which is supposed to constitute our awareness of the letters providing us with a reason seems most apparent when we intentionally The evident implication is that any special feeling to be found when we let ourselves be guided must just be a matter of what it feels like to look at something careful attention.
Wittgenstein clearly regards this observation as undermining the point of our initial appeal to the distinctive feeling of guidance. Why does it do so? What, indeed, was the point of the appeal? The answer is that we had hoped that the feeling of guidance constituted awareness of a mechanism that effects the transition from our seeing the written letters to our speaking them aloud:
We imagine that a feeling enables us to perceive as it were a connecting mechanism between the look of the word and the sound that we utter. For when I speak of the experiences of being influenced, of causal connexion, of being guided, that is really meant to imply that I as it were feel the movement of the lever which connects seeing the letters with speaking. (PI §170)
Once we realize that the feeling of guidance is just the feeling of paying close attention to something and related phenomena, we are supposed to see that it is not plausibly understood as constituting a peek at the workings of a connecting mechanism .
Let us draw all these points together. Reading words aloud is an exercise of selfconscious rationality. The words on the page justify my saying what I do, and it is because of my recognition of the justification they provide me that I act. The interlocutor wants to account for this explanatory relationship mechanistically, but he wants to do so in a way that captures the self-conscious rationality in play. So he imagines a connecting mechanism his access to which
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is not third-personal and theoretical as it would be if we were positing some physical, say computational, process mediating the transition from perception to performance but firstpersonal and experiential a matter of his felt awareness of the letters he sees guiding what he says. The appeal to the experience of being guided by the letters is meant to play a role analogous to the appeal to images in the case of the guidance conception of understanding. In both cases, the aim is to identify items in the realm of sentience that constitute processes of sapience or as we can now say, of self-conscious rationality. In both cases, finally,
Wittgenstein traces the failure of the attempt to an insufficient appreciation of the multiplicity of circumstances that we must have in view to grasp the phenomena at issue (see PI §172-173).
5. K ripke on rationality and guidance meaning and understanding. The skeptical paradox outlined in that book is almost always read as centered on the question of how to account for the normativity of meaning. As I mentioned at the outset, this interpretive assumption is at the root of the great interest in the normativity of meaning in recent decades.
criticizes various candidate accounts of the constitution of meaning, such as dispositionalism, on the ground that they fail to accommodate normativity. But the exposition of the skeptical paradox is complicated and multifaceted. Intertwined with the examination of our various failed attempts to provide for normativity is an additional thread of skeptical thought whose concern at its core is to establish our inability to account for the explanatory role that we ordinarily suppose have suggested that this role should be understood in terms
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-conscious rationality in using and responding to expressions and utterances. And I have argued that the interlocutor is attracted to the guidance conception because it seems to provide a way of gaining a distinctive kind of insight into the workings of self-conscious rationality in such cases. In this this interlocutor. Indeed, the commitment to the guidance conception is absolute:
he believes the failure of the conception to provide a satisfactory account of the putative rationalexplanatory role of understanding implies that it cannot in fact play this role.
To see that Kripke, at least some of the time, frames the skeptical paradox as concerned with the rational-explanatory role of our grasp of meaning, consider the following passage:
Almost all of and 57, without any thought to the theoretical possibility that a quus-like rule might have been appropriate! And we do so without justification. Of course, if asked why we said quarry The entire point of the sceptical argument is that ultimately we reach a level where we act without any reason in terms of which we can justify our action. We act unhesitatingly but blindly (1982, p.87, ellipsis in original).
The question with which the skeptical argument is here said to be concerned is why we . This is an explanatory question about an action of ours; it asks why we responded as we did when presented with a certain problem framed using + . The import of the skeptical argument, as here represented, is that what we are inclined to say in answer to this question does It is in relation to the idea that grasp of meaning can put us in touch with reasons, reasons upon which we may then self-consciously act, that we should hear remarks such as, The sceptic argues that when I answered 125 to the problem 68+57 , my answer was an unjustified leap in the dark (1982, p.15) . To take an unjustified leap in the dark is to act while lacking a justification, a reason, for which one thus acts. The skeptic is here represented as arguing that I do not have a reason for answering as I do, and so a fortiori, that I do not have an understanding es me with awareness of such a reason. Of course, our ordinary presumption is that we do have such reasons for using and responding to expressions and utterances as we do. That is why the claim to the contrary amounts to a kind of skepticism.
uses and responses are invariably unjustified stabs in the dark? Here is not the place to reconstruct the This is not an isolated instance, and cannot be dismissed as a rhetorical flourish. The idea that there must be an item in my mind that in some sense or another shows me how I am to proceed is everywhere present in the exposition of the skeptical paradox, and our inability to find any regress-proof candidates for this item is precisely what motivates the skeptical conclusion. To say that there is a general rule in my mind that tells me how to add in the future is only to throw the problem back on to other rules that also seem to be given only in terms of finitely many cases. What can there be in my mind that I make use
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of when I act in the future? It seems the entire idea of meaning vanishes into thin air (1982, pp.21-22) .
that emerges here is striking. It suggests that the real source of meaning skepticism lies in a deep commitment to our uncovering a mechanistic basis for any supposed exercise of self-conscious rationality. As a corollary, it suggests that we can defeat the specter of meaning skepticism if we can come to see why such an account does not have to be possible.
